THE RECENT METHODOLOGICAL MOVEMENT in Buddhist studies known as Critical Buddhism (hihan bukkyõ −|[î) is characterized by several far-ranging and rather controversial conclusions aimed at undermining the status quo in East Asian Buddhist orthodoxy and in the conventional scholarship on Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. The Critical Buddhist scholars have sought to reexamine many of the major developments in East Asian Buddhist thought in terms of their consistency with the fundamental Buddhist philosophy of causality expressed in P"li and early Mah"y"na Buddhist texts. Critical Buddhism is probably best known for its bold claims that "tath"gatagarbha (nyoraizõ Øû‰) thought is not Buddhism" and that "Zen is not Buddhism." 1 But the real signi³cance of such hyperbole is its chal-ing that the 75-fascicle text is a preliminary, incomplete, and therefore secondary (even dubious) body of writing, and that the 12-fascicle text exempli³es Dõgen's essential teaching based on dependent origination, which MATSUMOTO Shirõ insists was developed by the Buddha as "antithetical to dh"tu-v"da" (1989, p. 8) .
The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate the views of Critical Buddhism on how the two Shõbõgenzõ texts illuminate Dõgen's critical perspective on original-enlightenment thought in terms of his attitude to causality and karmic retribution. These issues are also explored in light of the way conventional Dõgen scholars have responded to the Critical Buddhist exponents. The paper will ³rst explain how and why the 12-fascicle text has become so important in Critical Buddhism, and then examine the current debate with traditionalist scholars who continue to assert the priority of the 75-fascicle text. In this paper I will use the term "traditional Buddhism" to refer collectively to the views of those scholars who have rebutted certain key aspects of the Critical Buddhist approach to Dõgen studies. This label is unfortunately not without quali³cations, since it refers to a variety of positions, and I will distinguish two distinct traditionalist perspectives. One maintains that there is no signi³cant change in Dõgen's approach from his early to later writings. The other seeks a compromise by acknowledging some degree of change, though with a different and more complex rationale than argued by Critical Buddhism. 4 In the concluding section, I will comment on two interrelated points in evaluating the contributions of Critical Buddhism. First, I will show some of the limitations in both the Critical and traditional positions on the Shõbõgenzõ, which often fail to take into account the full religious and historical context of Kamakura Buddhism, and thereby overlook (for example) af³nities between popular setsuwa ßÊ literary conceptions of karma and Dõgen's 12-fascicle text. Finally, I will consider one of the most commonly voiced critiques of Critical Buddhism: that it represents a disguised resurfacing of "militant fundamentalism" since it sets out to judge right and wrong forms of Buddhism and disavows all types of syncretism. In that context I will frame the Shõbõgenzõ debate by clarifying the relation between the evaluative hermeneutics of medieval Buddhist scholasticism and the objectivity of contemporary Buddhist studies. I will also brieµy discuss 4 In this article I am primarily dealing with issues in Dõgen studies and with those who have critiqued the Critical Buddhist view of the 12-fascicle text. However, there have been numerous other responses, including those by Lambert Schmithausen, Takasaki Jikidõ, Hirakawa Akira, and Sueki Fumihiko (a former student of Tamura Yoshirõ and a leading scholar in Tendai studies), some of which are discussed in SWANSON 1993, and to which HAKAMAYA (1992a) has responded in part.
the broader social concerns of Critical Buddhism in light of parallel developments in Western religious thought, including liberation and deconstructionist theologies.
Critical Buddhist Methodology vs. Traditional Approaches
The importance of the Shõbõgenzõ for Critical Buddhist methodology is evident from the inception of the movement, which began with a series of books in 1989 and 1990 . These books, in turn, were largely based on essays delivered and published in the mid-1980s by scholars in the Buddhist Studies Department of Komazawa University in Tokyo, especially Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirõ. These scholars were interested in Dõgen's view of karma as a key to evaluating the relevance of Buddhist thought for a variety of social discrimination issues affecting their own university, its af³liation with the Sõtõ sect, and Japanese society as a whole. These issues include the granting of Buddhist initiation names (kaimyõ we) to the deceased based on their social rank, a practice that resulted in the unjust treatment of the outcast burakumin (untouchable) community and other minority or dispossessed groups. 5 Buddhism in Japan had evolved over the course of history into religious institutions primarily concerned with funeral ceremonies. The Sõtõ sect recently began to realize that it had been performing this social function for the lower classes in a rather reprehensibile fashion. Hakamaya and Matsumoto are part of a widespread response to a sense of frustration and disappointment in Buddhism, which appeared to be an anachronistic, authoritarian, dogmatic, and socially rigid institution instead of a genuinely contemporary, progressive, and µexible advocate for justice and reform. In their attempt to find out what had gone wrong with Buddhism and how it could be corrected, the Critical Buddhists, especially Hakamaya, turned to Dõgen's Kamakura-era critique of Sino-Japanese Buddhism for guidance.
Hakamaya has reexamined East Asian Buddhism from the lens of Dõgen's later thought, which Hakamaya feels was subverted by subsequent developments in the Sõtõ institution. Critical Buddhism holds 5 Part of the impetus behind Critical Buddhism and other reform movements within the Sõtõ sect was a widespread sense of dismay with a 1979 lecture at a world religions congress by Soyu Machida, then head of the Sõtõ sect, who denied that there was Buddhist discrimination against burakumin. These comments caused an uproar that reverberated into many levels of the Sõtõ institution, from scholarship to the ritual activities of priests. See LOS ANGELES TIMES 1993 and ISHII 1990 . On the ritualized marginalization and scapegoating of the burakumin in Japanese society, see OHNUKI-TIERNEY 1987. that hongaku thought denies causality on the basis of a nondualistic doctrine whose real aim is to assimilate local animistic-naturalistic cults, and that it thus tends to foster a false sense of equality that mitigates the need for social responsibility. Original enlightenment and related doctrines such as tath"gatagarbha and Buddha-nature (busshõ [ §) espouse an uncritical tolerance and syncretism that foster, in the name of universal, nondiscriminating compassion, such problematic viewpoints as the demand for societal harmony (wa É) over individuality and a tacit compliance with militarism. These attitudes are in turn supported politically by totalitarian and nationalist ideologies as well as intellectually by nihonjinron Õû^Ç ("Japanese-ism") rhetoric that ends up abetting ethnic discrimination. 6 The basic weakness of hongaku thought, according to the Critical Buddhists, is that ontologically it does not allow for the existence of an Other, since all things are considered to arise on from the single, undifferentiated primordial dh"tu or locus, and that it is thus rendered epistemologically and ethically incapable of dealing with the complex manifestations of otherness that force concrete ethical choices. As Sallie KING points out in a discussion of Buddha-nature doctrine, the texts prized in East Asian Buddhist traditions have tended to emphasize such things as nondiscrimination [in the epistemological rather than social sense] and nonconceptual wisdom, which are dif³cult to reconcile with the complexities of resolving competing claims, for example, or balancing needs against resources, which require that one be very precise in distinguishing particulars, that one make informed judgments, and that one regard such activities as important and valuable. (1991, p. 170) That is, the hongaku and Buddha-nature doctrines lack a basis for developing situationally speci³c, ethically evaluative judgments, and the result is an unreµective endorsement of the status quo. According to HAKAMAYA:
Although some interpret the doctrine of original enlightenment as a theory of equality since it claims to recognize the fundamental universal enlightenment of all people, this is actually a gross misunderstanding. In fact, the doctrine of orig-6 For example, Richard DeMartino has commented on the fact that when he interviewed D. T. Suzuki in the mid 1960s for The Asahi Journal (14 March, 1965) , Suzuki insisted that Buddhism practiced compassion based on "motherly love," but seemed unwilling to acknowledge a problematic side of Buddhism in society, such as discrimination or acquiescence to militaristic nationalism.
inal enlightenment, which in a facile way requires seeking out the fundamental uni³ed ground of enlightenment, must be considered the primary source of [social] discrimination. (1989, p. 142) In Japan, this means accepting or even supporting the "myth of Japanese uniqueness" and related nationalist/nativist/Nihonist rhetoric that pervaded post-Tokugawa, especially prewar, intellectual life (see DALE 1986) . Zen, in particular, has often hidden its support for the status quo behind what is, in effect, an elitist aestheticism based on the notion that everything reµects the Buddha Dharma (zen'itsu-buppõ 6s[À).
Although Dõgen never explicitly mentions, let alone criticizes, hongaku in any of his writings, he ³rst exposed its underlying limitations in his famous "doubt" about why every Buddha has had to practice if all beings are inherently enlightened (ABE 1992; TAMURA 1965 TAMURA , 1984 YAMAUCHI 1986; IKEDA 1991a) . Dõgen is traditionally considered to have answered this doubt, experienced at the outset of his career, in his critique of the substantialist tendency referred to in the Shõbõgenzõ as the "Senika heresy," which maintains the existence of a permanent soul that transcends the life and death of the body. In addition, Dõgen's doctrines of the oneness of practice and realization (shushõ-ittõ @ãsf) and the impermanence of Buddha-nature (mujõ-busshõ [ø[ §) stress the dynamic, here-and-now (genjõ ê¨) dimension of hongaku thought, according, especially, to the early Shõbõgenzõ commentaries by Senne and Kyõgõ. Moreover, in the 75-fascicle text he occasionally uses other "hon-" compound terms favorably, such as honshõ-myõshð ûãU@, or "original realization and marvelous practice." Yet he constructs a creative compromise throughout his career by indirectly refuting problematic aspects of original enlightenment while reorienting its basic implications in terms of the continuing process of realization. According to the traditional view, these doctrines are expressed in fascicles such as "Genjõkõan" [Spontaneous realization] and "Busshõ" [Buddha-nature] , which form the core of the 75-fascicle text (these are two of the ³rst three fascicles in the standard editions). They were developed by Dõgen in the middle part of his career, especially from the mid-1230s to the early 1240s when he lived outside Kyoto and later at Eihei-ji in the Echizen mountains. The 12-fascicle version of the Shõbõgenzõ, compiled posthumously by ³rst disciple Ejõ in 1255 largely from texts written in the 1250s, was primarily directed toward monks at an entry level of training, and is traditionally regarded as an extension of the 75-fascicle text that does not change or add signi³cantly to its message.
The Critical Buddhists seek to reverse the view that the 12-fascicle text is secondary to the 75-fascicle text. Hakamaya's claim is that in the writings of the 75-fascicle text, which embrace a holistic, naturalist perspective, Dõgen was still struggling with hongaku thought and unable to fully overcome its inµuence. Hakamaya contends that the 12-fascicle text is the product of a dramatic and decisive change of heart (henka) by Dõgen based on his heightened awareness of karmic causality or "deep faith in causality" (jinshin inga L=ƒF), and comprises a sharpened, more devastating critique of hongaku thought. Like Indian and Tibetan M"dhyamika Buddhism, which Critical Buddhism greatly admires as exponents of true (i.e., critical not topical) Buddhism, Dõgen was now thoroughly clear and penetratingly critical about what he negated. This fundamental, decisive change in Dõgen's attitude occurred, according to the Critical Buddhists, around 1248 when Dõgen returned from a disillusioning visit to the Rinzai Five Mountains center in Kamakura, where he had gone to preach at the invitation of Hõjõ Tokiyori.
7 This change or radical reversal (gyakuten) is different from, though by no means unrelated historically and spiritually to, an earlier change that occurred around 1243 when Dõgen was ³rst leaving Kyoto (see BIELEFELDT 1985) . The change of the Kyoto-to-Echizen period, according to a number of modern sources Bielefeldt cites, was apparently marked by a sense of dissipation and decline in Dõgen's writing, accompanied by an aggressively sectarian, dogmatic, and argumentative outlook in which he all too eagerly abandoned liberal social views that he had previously advocated (perhaps in pursuit of aristocratic patronage), such as support for women and laypersons in the quest for enlightenment. According to some traditional scholars (primarily of Rinzai orientation, such as Yanagida Seizan and Furuta Shõkin), the monastocentric, puritanical outlook of the 12-fascicle text can be seen as a product of Dõgen's extended decline, while other traditionalists (primarily of Sõtõ orientation, such as Kagamishima Genryð and Kawamura Kõdõ) view this text as part of a renewed effort at strengthening discipline in Zen training.
According to the Critical Buddhist view, however, even the latter position does not go nearly far enough in highlighting the signi³-cance of the change that generated the 12-fascicle text. Dõgen's state of mind following this change can be compared to his determination 7 There is no record of Dõgen's teaching in Kamakura other than twelve Japanese poems included in his waka collection. Several revisionist historians have conjectured that Dõgen made the trip at the request of patrons rather than the Hõjõ, though the traditional explanation has become part of the sect's hagiography. when, twenty years earlier, he came back from China "empty-handed" after attaining enlightenment (according to the opening passage of Eihei kõroku ½rbAE, vol. I). Hakamaya maintains that the change does not represent a puritanical stance, but an enrichment and ful³llment of Dõgen's spiritual quest based on a deeply moral view of cause and effect and inspired by his initial doubt about hongaku thought. Dõgen's change is based on his understanding of the need to instruct disciples on the inviolability of karmic retribution, a process often referred to as "the karma produced is the karma received" (jigõ-jitoku À%À", or "you get what you deserve," in contemporary idiom). This approach undermines the original enlightenment view of Buddha-nature as a primordial endowment transcendent of bondage to karma. Hakamaya points out that in some passages of the 12-fascicle text Dõgen stresses the role of repentance or confession (sange Ht) in reversing negative karma and attaining transformation. However, Hakamaya also argues that Dõgen is very critical of the ritualization of sange in a variety of East Asian hongaku-based practices which promote the misconception that evil karma can be facilely absolved through puri³cation ceremonies (sange metsuzai Htn&; HAKAMAYA 1992b, pp. 245-88, esp. 249) . The problem with this view is that it regards all de³lement and evil behavior as extraneous to the basic purity of an essentially unde³lable Buddha-nature. 8 Therefore, Dõgen's ³nal major change becomes the role model for the Critical Buddhists' attempt to recover the basic Buddhist concept of causality and refute hongaku thought as a major corruption of that doctrine.
The examination of the 12-fascicle text, so crucial for the Critical Buddhist project, marks what is probably the ³rst time that Dõgen's thought has been analyzed by specialists in other schools of Buddhism, particularly M"dhyamika and Yog"c"ra in India and Tibet. This in turn has elicited an enormously profuse and thoughtful response from traditional Dõgen scholars. Although Hongaku shisõ hihan, the title of HAKAMAYA 'S book (1989) that unveiled the new methodology, refers only to a critique of original enlightenment, the second half of the book deals almost exclusively with Dõgen's rejec-tion of Zen notions such as kyõge betsuden î'ƒ) (special transmission outside the scriptures) and sankyõ itchi XîsO (unity of the three teachings of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism), and it introduces an attempt to rethink the signi³cance of the 12-fascicle text. While his second book (1990) does not deal with Dõgen, his third book (1992b) specializes in issues concerning the composition and compilation of the 12-fascicle text. MATSUMOTO'S book (1989) criticizing tath"gatagarbha thought, and ITÕ Takatoshi's book (1992a) criticizing Chinese Buddhism, have also commented on the 12-fascicle text, at least indirectly by citing Hakamaya's views.
Two major collections have been published in response to Critical Buddhism, involving many of the leading Buddhist scholars at Komazawa University as well as other Sõtõ authorities, who have engaged in a creative dialogue with the views expressed by Hakamaya and Matsumoto. These collections contain a two-pronged exchange of ideas. One collection (NARA 1992) focuses, in an advocacy-response format, on the extensive or "meta" issues of resituating Dõgen, and Zen as a whole, in the context of the overall development of Buddhism, and includes a section on the 12-fascicle text with contributions by Hakamaya, Kawamura, and Itõ Shðken. The other collection (KAGAMI-SHIMA and SUZUKI 1991) is an intensive textual study that probes in great detail many diverse and highly specialized aspects of each of the fascicles in the 12-fascicle text in comparison with the 75-fascicle text.
9
For Critical Buddhism the extensive issues cannot be separated from the intensive issues concerning the Shõbõgenzõ, though the former are perhaps better publicized.
The Debate on the Shõbõgenzõ Texts
As indicated above, Critical Buddhism has raised questions about which version of the Shõbõgenzõ reµects Dõgen's intention to create a uni³ed text and presents his authentic philosophical message. Prior to Hakamaya's approach, scholarship on the Shõbõgenzõ 10 tended to focus on two areas: ³rst, studies of the relation between the 75-fascicle text edited by Ejõ and commented on by Senne (Shõbõgenzõ Okikigaki ±ÀQ‰:l-) and Kyõgõ (Shõbõgenzõ shõ ±ÀQ‰¿) and several other early post-Dõgen versions, including a 60-fascicle text edited by ³fth patriarch Giun in 1329, an 84-fascicle text edited by Bonsei in 1419, and a 28-fascicle text (n.d.) favored in certain Sõtõ temples 9 See especially the bibliographical record by TSUNODA 1991. 10 An inµuential article cited by both Kawamura and Hakamaya is by SUGIO, 1985. known as the Himitsu¸O (secret or "concealed") Shõbõgenzõ (KAWA-MURA 1980; ; second, studies of the Chinese (Mana or Shinji O°) Shõbõgenzõ collection of three hundred kõans compiled in 1235 and the Japanese (Kana or Keji 6°) collection of Dõgen's sermons and philosophical essays, many of them dealing with the kõan cases contained in the Chinese collection (KAWAMURA 1987; ISHII 1988; HEINE 1994) .
KAWAMURA (1992, p. 231) surveys several views of the function of the 12-fascicle text prevalent before the "Hakamaya thesis." One, as mentioned above, is that there is a continuity between the texts, with the 75-fascicle version serving as the base and the 12-fascicle one as its extension. Another view is that the 75-fascicle text expresses the standpoint of satori and the 12-fascicle text expresses the standpoint of faith (variations of this idea identify the respective standpoints as realization and resolve-practice, transmission and salvation, reason and practice, or philosophy and morality). According to this view, both texts contribute to the goal of a 100-fascicle text that Dõgen envisioned, but was unable to achieve, shortly before his premature death in 1253. But as Hakamaya points out in his response to Kawamura's essay, there are now two main approaches to the 12-fascicle text. One (encompassing all of the views described by Kawamura) is that the 75-fascicle and the 12-fascicle texts are essentially of equal validity though different in style and purpose, with the 75-fascicle text on a higher spiritual plane to be studied by those approaching or having already reached enlightenment and the 12-fascicle text serving a more practical, introductory function for novice initiates; taken together they contribute eightyseven fascicles to the envisioned one hundred, and constitute in themselves an 87-fascicle text. The Critical Buddhist view, as described above, is that the 12-fascicle text reµects a decisive change of heart and constitutes the authentic Shõbõgenzõ, with the 75-fascicle text seen as a preliminary and un³nished version of somewhat questionable value (HAKAMAYA 1992c).
The debate generated on issues concerning the relation between the 12-, 28-, 60-, 75-, 84-, and 87-fascicle versions (as well as other early versions, including 83-and 89-fascicle texts, plus an 88-fascicle text that combines the 60-and 28-fascicle versions) reµects an effort to come to terms with and overcome two long-standing, mutually reinforcing misconceptions concerning the composition of the Shõbõgenzõ. The ³rst misconception is that the Shõbõgenzõ consists of ninety-³ve fascicles, which is the number included in many modern editions, most notably the paperback version published by Iwanami Bunko (ETÕ 1939 (ETÕ -1943 . The second misconception is that these ninety-³ve fascicles were the ones intended for the projected 100-fascicle text. The modern 95-fasci-cle edition is actually based on a Tokugawa-era invention that was supported by a so-called de³nitive Meiji-era edition. The aim of the ³rst 95-fascicle edition published in 1690 by Kõzen was to collect, 11 after years of confusion about the exact nature of the founder's writings, all of the available Shõbõgenzõ materials, which consisted primarily of Dõgen's informal (jishu ½L-style) lectures in contrast to the more formal (jõdõ î}-style) lectures collected in the Eihei kõroku ½rbAE. This text was reissued in 1811 by Gentõ and again in 1906 as the of³cial Sõtõ sect edition, known as the Daihonzan Eihei-ji edition. The 95-fascicle edition, however, made no attempt to recreate the structure or intentionality of Dõgen's original manuscript and is thus of no help in reconstructing what Dõgen projected for the 100-fascicle version.
Inµuenced by the textual studies of Mizuno Yaoko, Hakamaya organizes the versions of the Shõbõgenzõ into three categories: the concealed manuscript, or the 28-fascicle text; the posthumously edited manuscripts, primarily including the 60-fascicle and 75-fascicle texts; and the 12-fascicle text, which he argues is the collection compiled by Dõgen himself and which reµects the innermost thoughts of Dõgen in his ³nal teachings.
12 Hakamaya also considers the 12-fascicle text to have been a "concealed" text. Thus, Critical Buddhism rejects the traditional emphasis on the priority of the 75-fascicle version, which contains most of the famous philosophical essays, including, in addition to those previously mentioned, "Uji" (being-time), "Shõji" (birthdeath), and "Zenki" (total dynamism). The 12-fascicle text lacks the creative rhetoric and metonymic wordplays for which Dõgen has often been praised by modern philosophers, and it has been seen as puritanical and socially conservative because of its contents, which center on practical instructions for monks emphasizing external symbols and ritual. But the important point for Critical Buddhists is that in fascicles such as "Jinshin inga" (deep faith in causality) and "Sanjigo" (karmic retribution through the past, present, and future), this text, unlike other Shõbõgenzõ versions, stresses the irrevocability of karma and causality in a way consistent with early Buddhist thought. The 12-fascicle text argues repeatedly for the law of retribution (gõhõ or goppõ %³), by which good deeds will create bene³cial karma leading to positive consequences; indeed, any good deed can reverse evil and result eventually in redemption. Conversely, evil deeds necessarily beget negative karma and lead to rebirth in one of the three evil 11 Some of the confusion concerning the different versions is traceable to Tokugawaera disputes between Tenkei Denson, who supported the 60-fascicle text, and Manzan Dõhaku, who supported the 75-fascicle text. 12 HAKAMAYA 1992b, p. 192 . See chart on page 51.
realms (hell, hungry ghosts, or animals). According to the "Sanjigo" fascicle the effects of karmic retribution are felt in present and future lives, and for Hakamaya the literal view of karma offers a blueprint for social responsibility. The 12-fascicle text, according to Critical Buddhism, is also consistent in its refutation of original-enlightenment thought, which tends to deny causality because of an uncritical tolerance and syncretism and which is therefore rendered invalid as a basis for evaluative, ethical decision-making. For example, the "Shizen biku" [Fourth-stage monk] fascicle speci³cally negates hongaku tendencies that have crept into Zen thought, such as Hui-neng's doctrine of kenshõ Ø § (seeing into [one's own] nature), which may suggest a hypostatization of a primordial, substantive "nature" (shõ §). "Sanjigo" explicitly refutes the view of karma endorsed by T'ang Chinese Ch'an master Chang-sha, who suggests the possibility of transcending karmic consequences. In the 12-fascicle text, Dõgen also demonstrates a willingness to critically revise his earlier thinking with regard to causality and original enlightenment. In the "Bukkyõ" [Buddhist teachings] fascicle of the 75-fascicle text, for instance, Dõgen associates the twelve links of dependent co-arising with the preliminary pratyekabuddha stage rather than the ³nal bodhisattva stage of realization, thus implying that there is a level of insight beyond causality. In a similar vein, in the "Gyõji" fascicle of the 75-fascicle text Dõgen argues that the cosmological principle of gyõji '³, or the sustained exertion of all human and natural phenomena, is more fundamental than dependent origination. But throughout the 12-fascicle text, it is clear that only "deep faith in causality" (jinshin inga)-a phrase repeated over two dozen times-is correct and that any subtle denial of causality is in error. Indeed, in "Shizen biku" Dõgen speci³cally criticizes the hongaku-oriented identi³cation of mountains and rivers with ultimate reality-a view that he frequently expresses in the 75-fascicle text-as an example of the substantialist Senika heresy.
Furthermore, the 12-fascicle text refutes a variety of non-Buddhist standpoints that have overly inµuenced Zen doctrine. For example, Dõgen argues that the philosophies of Confucius and Lao Tzu, which have been mixed with Buddhism to form the syncretic sankyõ itchi ideology, fail to understand causality. He also repudiates an assortment of local folk religions and supernatural beliefs all too frequently assimilated by East Asian Buddhist sects, including Zen. Dõgen's critique brings to mind the refutation of Vedic ritualism and magic from the standpoint of causal logic as expressed in the Tevijja Sutta of the D ‡gha Nik"ya. Hakamaya cites the following passage in the "Kie-buppõsõbõ" We should not act like those who, awe-struck, vainly take refuge in mountain deities and spirits or worship at nonBuddhist shrines, for it is impossible to gain release from suffering in this way…. The wise person does not engage in such practices, for they only increase suffering and obstruct bene³-cial rewards. One must not take refuge in erroneous ways but clearly repudiate them. (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, p. 418) In addition to the thematic and stylistic unity revolving around practices based on karmic retribution, an important feature of the 12-fascicle text noted by both Critical Buddhist and traditional scholars is its sequential integrity, especially when contrasted with the 75-fascicle text, which was arranged by Ejõ primarily to reµect the chronological order in which the fascicles were composed. Each fascicle in the 12-fascicle text deals systematically with a stage in the process of realization, beginning with departure from home (shukke) and receiving the precepts (jukai), and moving on to such topics as awakening the bodhi-seeking mind (hotsubodaishin), paying homage to the Buddhas (kuyõ shobutsu), repentance and puri³cation of karmic conditioning (jinshin inga), the fourth stage of a monk's meditation (shizen biku), and ³nally the equanimity and compassionate outµows of the bodhisattva's attainment (hachidainingaku, the eight features of the enlightened person). The entire text forms a complete and persuasive religious document explicating the path from the initial impulse and determination to practice to the culmination and after-effects of realization, and it is to be studied by a disciple at the appropriate stage in the quest.
The Rewritten Fascicles
One of the main points of evidence the Critical Buddhists used to support the priority of the 12-fascicle text is Dõgen's apparent rewriting of several fascicles in the 75-fascicle or 60-fascicle texts to express a new, more authentic standpoint for the 12-fascicle text. 13 This textual 50
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13 Some of the debate revolves around a cryptic colophon to the Hachidainingaku fascicle written by Ejõ and discovered in 1930 in a manuscript in Yõkõ-ji temple. Ejõ speaks of Dõgen's desire to create a 100-volume text (the only reference to such an idea) by rewriting all the fascicles, and he mentions the need to honor the "twelve fascicles" (or it could be read as the "twelfth fascicle") as being consistent with Š"kyamuni's teachings (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, p. 496 14 Of these fascicles, two cases-(b) and (c)-stand out because they were rewritten around the time of their original composition in the 1240s. Case (b) exhibits the most overlapping and even unity between the two versions. Traditional scholars acknowledge that "Den'e" was probably composed as a draft for the version included in the 12-fascicle text, thereby lending credence to the arguments of the Critical Buddhists. In regard to case (c), however, in which the two versions were ³rst delivered on the same winter evening at Yoshimine-dera in 1244 (prior to the Kamakura visit), the traditional view has been that the "Hotsumujõshin" is intended for advanced monks while "Hotsubodaishin" is for novices. Critical Buddhism reverses this by suggesting that the latter demonstrates a clearer and deeper refutation of hongaku thought. "Hotsumujõshin" uses hongaku-style rhetoric to identify the one-mind or all-encompassing mind with each and every aspect of the concrete phenomenal world, including the human and natural realms, but "Hotsubodaishin" departs from hongaku thought in 14 ITÕ Shðken (1991, p. 378 ) also points out an af³nity on the topic of reading and interpreting sðtras with the 75-fascicle "Nyorai zenshin" (complete body of Tath"gata).
emphasizing that the process of life-death during each moment invariably bears karmic consequences. In cases (a) and (d), the new versions were written in the post-Kamakura period of the 1250s: (a) is the last fascicle in the 75-fascicle text and the ³rst in the 12-fascicle text, and the two fascicles in (d) offer different interpretations of the famous "Pai-chang's wild fox" kõan. Finally, case (e), composed in the last year of Dõgen's life, is the latest of all these writings and the only one of the rewritten fascicles for which the initial version is not included in any extant edition of the 75-fascicle text. The interpretation of case (d) of the rewritten fascicles expresses as much as any other single argument in their repertoire the heart of the Critical Buddhists' view of Dõgen's concept of karma and its relevance for overcoming dh"tu-v"da viewpoints in East Asian Buddhism as a whole. The two versions both begin by citing the famous "wild fox" kõan originally included in Pai-chang's recorded sayings and also cited in a variety of kõan collections, including the Mumonkan (no. 2) and the Shõyõroku (no. 8), transmission of the lamp histories such as the Tenshõ kõtõroku and Shðmon rentõeyõ, kõan commentaries, and dozens of Sung-era recorded sayings texts. The importance of this kõan for Dõgen is demonstrated by his use of it in his own kõan collection, the Shinji/Mana Shõbõgenzõ, and his commentary on it in the Shõbõgenzõ zuimonki and in several passages in the Eihei kõroku, including a verse commentary in the ninth volume. According to the narrative of the source kõan, a monk has been trans³gured into a fox for ³ve hundred lifetimes as a punishment for expressing a misunderstanding of causality: in response to a disciple's inquiry, he maintained that even a person of great cultivation (daishugyõ Ø@') does "not fall into causality" (furaku inga #%ƒF). The monk is released from this fate, and the fox corpse is buried with Buddhist rites, through the "turning word" (ittengo s%B) of Pai-chang, who maintains the virtue of "not obscuring causality" (fumai inga #*ƒF). The fundamental paradox of this kõan is that by verbally denying causality the monk is victimized by karma, yet by Pai-chang's af³rming its impact he gains release. Yet, as the commentary by Dõgen and other Zen masters indicates, there are several problematical points in interpreting the kõan, including the final fates of the monk (does he continue to transmigrate or attain full nir v"«a?), and the fox spirit. Dõgen also ponders the idea that the fox might have deceived Paichang into believing it was really a monk, in which case its corpse should not have received a Buddhist burial.
On the other hand, the basic message of the kõan about the inviolability of karmic causality, as indicated by the phrase fumai inga, seems quite clear. Yet most commentaries on the kõan case, including those in the two kõan collections, highlight the provisionality and ultimately the indistinguishability of the furaku inga and fumai inga responses.
15 Dõgen, in the earlier "Daishugyõ" fascicle, seems to echo that view:
Because causality necessarily means full cause and complete effect, there is no reason for a discussion concerning "falling into" or "not falling into," "obscuring" or "not obscuring" [causality] . If "not falling into causality" is incorrect, then "not obscuring causality" is also incorrect. Nevertheless, because of a fundamental misunderstanding, [the old man] was ³rst trans³gured into a wild fox body and then released from being a wild fox. And although "not falling into causality" was incorrect in the age of Buddha K"syapa, it may not be incorrect in the age of Buddha Š"kyamuni. Although "not obscuring causality" released the wild fox body in the current age of Buddha Š"kyamuni, it may not have been effective in the age of Buddha K"syapa. (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, pp. 232-33) Both fascicles dealing with this kõan are critical of the Senika heresy, which advocates a "return" to an original nature or source and sees the release from the fox body as a symbol of the monk resuming his true nature. Yet, whereas "Daishugyõ" refuses to criticize the old man's view of furaku inga, "Jinshin inga" repudiates Dõgen's position of a decade before in which he equated causality and the transcendence of causality. In the later work he asserts quite emphatically that only fumai inga is accurate and that furaku inga, which amounts to the denial of causality (hotsumu inga ¾[ƒF), is mistaken.
The single greatest limitation of the monks of Sung China today is that they do not realize that "not falling into causality" is a false teaching. It is a pity that even though they encounter the true Dharma of the Tath"gata correctly transmitted from patriarch to patriarch, they accept the views of those who would deny causality. They must awaken right away to the principle of causality. The expression "not obscuring causality" of the current head monk of Mt. Pai-chang demonstrates that he never denied causality. It is clear that practice, or cause, leads to realization, or result. (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, p. 433) 15 According to the Mumonkan verse, in SHIBAYAMA 1974, p. 34: Not falling, not ignoring:/Odd and even are on one die./Not ignoring, not falling:/Hundreds and thousands of regrets!
Summary of the Critical Buddhists' Position
Next I will sum up the main arguments of Critical Buddhism before considering the responses of the traditional scholars. The central point of Critical Budddhism, particularly the Hakamaya thesis, is that in the 12-fascicle text Dõgen abandons and refutes his previous association with original enlightenment rhetoric and stresses the role of causality. That is, his philosophy of Zen undergoes a transformation from a metaphysical view that draws unwittingly from animism or naturalism and seeks a single source of reality (dh"tu) beyond causality to a literal, strict karmic determinism that emphasizes a moral imperative based on the fundamental condition that karmic retribution is active in each impermanent moment. Whereas the metaphysical view is based primarily on a transcendental contemplative awareness, the literal view requires a wisdom born of study and knowledge. One of the main features of the later writings, especially noticeable when comparing the rewritten fascicles to their earlier versions, is Dõgen's extensive use of Buddhist texts. Thus, the Critical Buddhists maintain that the philosophy of religion in the 12-fascicle text is characterized by intellectual life and scholarly learning through textual study rather than the intuitionism and suppression of discourse that is expressed, for example, in the "Bendõwa." In other words, the later text marks a transition from "zazan only" (shikan-taza) and "original realization and marvelous practice (honshõ myõshu) to "honor prajñ"" (hannya sonchõ) and "faith in causality" (jinshin inga) (ISHII 1990, p. 227) .
The overall aim of Critical Buddhism involves more than a simple reinterpretation of the Shõbõgenzõ. The aim is to use Dõgen's change of heart as a starting point from which to challenge the hongaku orthodoxy that has perpetuated social discrimination and tacitly supported the status quo on the basis of claims of epistemologial nondiscrimination and ontological dynamism. This challenge in turn involves rethinking the meaning of the nonduality of sa½s"ra (which is causal) and nirv"«a (which transcends causality). If we reµect back on the origins of the debate concerning the relation between these two dimensions, the Abhidharma analysis of the dharmic factors of phenomenal existence draws a strict dichotomy between conditioned (sa½sk£ta) dharmas, which are bound by the cause-effect process, and unconditioned (asa½sk£ta) dharmas, which are not bound by causeeffect. While the aim of early Mah"y"na šðnyav"da philosophy (M"dhyamika school and Prajñ"p"ramit" sðtras), according to most East Asian interpretations, is to demonstrate the inseparability or indistinguishability of the realms of the conditioned, or causal, and the unconditioned, or noncausal, this raises a delicate but crucial issue pursued by subsequent schools of thought: When causality and noncausality are equalized, which side of the nondualistic equationthe side of causality or the side of noncausality-is stressed in understanding spiritual freedom? In other words, does the equalization suggest the naturalist heretical position (jinen-gedõ À5'‰) that causality is considered from the standpoint of fundamental reality to be a part of noncausality, a position that might imply that one is inherently free from the effects of causality and thus does not have to attain puri³-cation by overcoming discrimination? Or does it suggest the equally problematic nihilistic position that noncausality is equalized on the side of causality, which implies that one can never attain freedom from causality no matter how much effort is exerted, and that there is thus no motivation to reverse the tendency toward social discrimination? In either case, the moral implications of the inevitability of karmic retribution and the need for repentance in the genuine sense are lost.
According to Critical Buddhism, the hongaku view reµected in Zen thought and expressed in the 75-fascicle Shõbõgenzõ actually compounds the conceptual and moral dilemmas implicit in the naturalist position. The hongaku view, by identifying ultimate reality with concrete phenomena, asserts nonduality from the standpoint of causality swallowing up noncausality and at the same time being swallowed up by it (since it does not necessarily require spiritual puri³cation). Thus there is no genuine freedom or nondiscrimination as claimed under the banner of universal freedom and equality. What occurs instead is an acceptance of things as they are without moral authentication or evaluative judgment. Thus the real problem is not simply a matter of identifying polarities or of shifting the conclusion from one side to the other, but of equalizing them in such a way that the moral component of karmic causality is highlighted rather than concealed. If the morality of cause-effect is obscured because it is overly inµuenced by an emphasis on noncausality, then genuine noncausality cannot be attained. For the Critical Buddhists, Dõgen resolves this dilemma by asserting in "Jinshin inga" that "the law of causality is clear and impersonal (or selµess; watakushi nashi)" (TERADA and MIZUNO 1972, p. 437) in the sense that it is universal and inviolable, and yet that it has an eminently subjective quality ("deep faith") in that the freedom of noncausality can be attained only in and through the continuing process of moral puri³cation perfected within the realm of causality (MATSU- MOTO 1991, p. 234 ). This recalls the M"dhyamika (Mðlamadhyama-k"rik" 25: 9-10) view that nirv"«a is found in terms of causalitynirv"«a occurs in the midst of sa½s"ra and not as an escape from it, yet is attained only through a fundamental change of perspective rather than the mere acceptance of causal relations. However, Dõgen's approach is based not on a nonrelational freedom from karma, but on an eminently µexible and polymorphous process in which the stages of practice and realization, while often simultaneous and overlapping, occur in irreversible sequence. 16 
The Responses of Traditional Scholars
While nearly all traditional scholars acknowledge the basic merit and even "sensational" impact of the issues raised by Critical Buddhism, they express mixed reactions concerning the long-term signi³cance of this new methodology. Kagamishima Genryð, one of the most senior and prominent scholars in Dõgen studies and the man who wrote the introduction to Jðnikanbon Shõbõgenzõ no shomondai, admits that there can be no turning back from some of the liberating effects of Critical Buddhism. He points out, for example, how far scholarship has progressed since Tokugawa-era scholar Tenkei Denson-known for his early but idiosyncratic commentary on the Shõbõgenzõ-argued rather dogmatically that the "Daishugyõ" fascicle is the true version while the "Jinshin inga" must be false. Yet Kagamishima also sounds a cautionary note, appraising Critical Buddhism as an overemphatic and rather biased (henchõ ‡b) approach to be contrasted with what he considers the more reasonable, mainstream compromise position of Ishii, Sugio Gen'yð, Shimizu Hideo, and others. The compromise position (which Kagamishima also challenges, nevertheless, though to a lesser extent), sees the 12-fascicle text as expressing a multivalent "spiritual change" that marks a shift in emphasis rather than a revolution in Dõgen's direction. The compromise suggests, for instance, that the 12-fascicle text must be seen only in connection with other writings and activities from Dõgen's later period.
Kagamishima's approach thus indicates that it is necessary to distinguish between two traditionalist positions-referred to below as (a) and (b)-for a total of three positions. At one end of the spectrum Critical Buddhism argues that Dõgen underwent a radical and deci-16 Another way of framing the issue of Dõgen's relation to nyoraizõ thought, suggested by MATSUMOTO, is to distinguish Dõgen's later view from three perspectives: (1) all things have Buddha-nature, therefore one must practice but the goal appears unattainable; (2) Buddha-nature encompasses all things, therefore one need not practice because the Buddha-nature is already present; (3) Buddha-nature is actualized by practice, therefore one must continue to practice. Dõgen's early standpoint is reµected in view (3) as a refutation of (1) and (2), but even this view does not suf³ciently emphasize the retributive consequences of karmic conditioning (1991, pp. 209ff). sive change, and at the opposite end the more conservative traditionalist (a) view maintains that there was no real change and that Dõgen stayed essentially the same throughout his life following his return from China. Both of these positions stress a single, simple standpoint, whereas the compromise traditionalist (b) view allows for change but not in the clear-cut and once-and-for-all way that the Critical Buddhists claim. The ³rst position holds that the 12-fascicle text, which was written during one relatively con³ned time span, supersedes the earlier text and is suf³cient for an understanding of Dõgen; the second position maintains the fundamental equality of the 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle texts, while asserting the ultimate priority of the former in terms of the more sophisticated audience it targets; and the third position explores complex areas of development in Dõgen's later writings and biography that affect an understanding of the relation between the 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle texts.
What links the two traditionalist positions is a basic skepticism regarding any attempt to prove Dõgen's intentionality concerning the priority of the 12-fascicle text. From that standpoint they both make a series of guerilla raids on Critical Buddhist strongholds, including interpretations of the rewritten fascicles and Dõgen's philosophy of causality. The traditional scholars have argued against Critical Buddhism and in support of the 75-fascicle text on several grounds, such as the difficulty of establishing that the "rewriting" was Dõgen's and not the editing of his disciples, and the existence of other apparently rewritten fascicles that do not appear in or express the standpoint of the 12-fascicle text. Furthermore, Dõgen's approach to the topic of causality is complex, and it is easy to mistake a shift in perspective for a fundamental change.
The leading ³gures of the traditionalist (a) position include Kagamishima and Kawamura Kõdõ. The latter, a specialist in the textual formation of the Shõbõgenzõ and its early medieval commentaries, is sympathetic to some of the main aims of Critical Buddhism, especially it's dramatizing of Dõgen's critical stance with regard to forms of Buddhism he considered de³cient. For example, Kawamura agrees that it is important to distinguish between Dõgen's approach to Zen and the problematic views of kyõge betsuden and sankyõ itchi, and also that it is helpful to compel contemporary Sõtõ scholars to rethink the issue of how substantive metaphysics has been smuggled into a variety of syncretistic Buddhist doctrines and practices. However, Kawamura believes that Dõgen maintained the same critical distance from heretical views throughout his career and that it is important not to misread and overstate Dõgen's criticisms. Instead, it is preferable to see Dõgen as straddling a middle-way position in regard to hongaku thought, accepting its positive features as an expression of the uni³ed nonsubstantive basis of contextual relations while refuting its tendency to obviate the need for sustained practice.
Kagamishima and Kawamura both argue that there is no ³rm evidence that Dõgen limited his message to the 12-fascicle text at the end of his life, or that he had come to reject the 75-fascicle text. Kawamura emphasizes Ejõ's role as an editor and interpreter of Dõgen. Ejõ's editing of the twelve fascicles two years after Dõgen's death is the only tangible evidence for the priority of the new text. Yet, as Kawamura points out, all the other evidence indicates that Ejõ asserted the priority of the 75-fascicle text. Ejõ apparently gained Dõgen's approval to edit the 75-fascicle text the year before the master's ³nal days. If Dõgen had emphasized the importance of the 12-fascicle text as he approached death, why did Ejõ not show this in a more vigorous way than by composing a single, cryptic (and long-lost) colophon to the "Hachidainingaku" fascicle (see note 13 above)? If the Critical Buddhists are correct, why did Ejõ not stop altogether his editing of the earlier fascicles, which Dõgen himself had continued to revise until nearly the very end of his life? Also, why did the other main disciples who were privy to Dõgen's way of thinking, Senne and Kyõgõ, comment only on the 75-fascicle text? KAGAMISHIMA wonders if there may be in the near future a discovery of another version of Ejõ's colophon that will further clarify-or perhaps complicate-our understanding of Dõgen's ³nal instructions or intentions (1991, p. 7) .
Furthermore, Kagamishima and Kawamura emphasize that it is simplistic to argue that the ³ve rewritten fascicles were revised for a single reason alone. The speci³c methods and purposes of rewriting vary signi³cantly from case to case, but the general impression of the rewritten fascicles indicates that the respective versions express distinct but complementary rather than conµicting viewpoints on a particular topic. During the course of his move from Kyoto to Echizen, Dõgen, they argue, recognized the necessity of addressing the concerns of several different types of disciples (students): those still needing persuasion to leave home, those already in monastic life but needing to refine and develop their training, and those approaching the ³nal stages of realization. For example, in the two versions of the fascicle on leaving home, the ³rst version ("Shukke") deals with home departure from the standpoint of jukai 1w, or the stage of receiving the precepts, while the second ("Shukke kudoku") examines it from the standpoint of kudoku O", or the following stage of attaining merit. Similarly, the "Daishugyõ" and "Jinshin inga" fascicles that reach drastically different conclusions concerning the phrase furaku inga (not falling into causality) may be approaching its meaning from different standpoints (KAGAMISHIMA 1991, p. 13) . "Daishugyõ" approves of the saying from the standpoint of ultimate reality, which transcends the distinction between causality and noncausality, while "Jinshin inga" criticizes it from a more restricted realm of discourse, conventional truth, in which the tendency to avoid or escape causality must be refuted. But in the ³nal analysis the two levels of discourse, ultimate and conventional, enhance and enrich one another to demonstrate a conclusion that would likely, though ironically, be supported by Critical Buddhism: the transcendence of causality is within, yet not merely within, causality, like the process of disentangling vines (kattõ Òn) by means of entangled vines as in the 75-fascicle text's "Kattõ." Therefore, the traditionalist (a) position is that the Shõbõgenzõ expresses multiple perspectives, so that the 12-fascicle text is not complete and autonomous but complementary with the 75-fascicle text in that the two texts intertwine general and speci³c, introductor y and advanced frames of reference without any sense of polarization between them.
ISHII Shðdõ, one of the leading representatives of what Kagamishima has identi³ed as the compromise view, is very sympathetic to the aims and methods of his friend and colleague, Hakamaya, and was one of the earliest to respond formally to Critical Buddhism. 17 Ishii agrees that Dõgen's approach to Buddhism is based primarily on wisdom (chie JŠ, Skt. prajñ") and learning rather than contemplation, despite the fact that Sõtõ is often characterized as a religion based on zazen-only or just-sitting (shikan-taza ï5¸â), a sectarian misunderstanding traceable to fourth patriarch Keizan that has been projected back to Dõgen. Without being too harsh on Keizan, who since the Tokugawa era has been revered by the sect as a kind of co-founder, Ishii feels that the purity of Dõgen's thought was subverted by the unBuddhistic syncretism and misleading simpli³cation inspired by Keizan and his disciples. Like the Critical Buddhists, Ishii argues that Dõgen should be understood as standing in accord with the critical approach to philosophy practiced in the M"dhyamika school in India and Tibet, which seeks to overcome all one-sided ³xations and delusions. In that context, Ishii cites the studies of Yamaguchi Zuihõ in the early 1980s that pointed out for the ³rst time the signi³cant af³nities between Dõgen and South-Central Asian Buddhism. He also maintains that Dõgen Zen is different from Chinese Ch'an, which has been overly inµuenced by Lao-Tzu and Confucius (though Ishii's view of Dõgen's Japani³cation as a purification of the syncretistic elements he found in China may be considered naive). On the question of interpreting the Shõbõgenzõ, Ishii endorses the Critical Buddhist focus on the 12-fascicle text as a means of generating a fundamental revision of the Sõtõ sect in a way that links classical theories of dependent origination to the contemporary need for social responsibility, though like other traditionalists he does not comment directly on social issues.
On the other hand, Ishii shares with the traditionalist (a) position a skepticism concerning several of the main conclusions of Critical Buddhism. First, he feels that Dõgen's attitude toward hongaku thought stayed relatively constant after his return from China, with no clearly discernible revision of thinking following his Kamakura visit. He sees Dõgen's constancy as a position of constructive ambivalence, standing not strictly for or against hongaku thought, but he also seems to put more emphasis than traditionalism (a) on Dõgen's struggle throughout his career for an appropriate communicative style and substance. Ishii agrees with Yamauchi Shun'yð, a specialist in Dõgen's relation to Japanese Tendai, that it is necessary at this stage of scholarship to take attention away from Dõgen's "doubt," which after all stemmed from his youthful concerns and inexperience (his rather unsophisticated question is not entirely relevant to the complex historical and textual issues involved in interpreting Dõgen's understanding of hongaku thought). Like traditionalism (a), Ishii is cautious not to overvalue the 12-fascicle text at the expense of Dõgen's other works. He points out that Dõgen edited and added to the 75-fascicle text until his death, so that the dates of writing and rewriting (as well as the question of how much disciples contributed to the revised versions) cannot be pinned down, especially considering the variety of Shõbõgenzõ texts. In particular, Ishii is skeptical of the role of the 12-fascicle text in relation to the so-called 100-fascicle project mentioned in Ejõ's colophon, because it is not entirely clear why this project would be important. Perhaps Dõgen was trying to emulate the juko hyakusoku †òß' style [poetic commentaries on one hundred kõan cases] and other Sung-era collections of recorded sayings, but if this is the case it does not support the Critical Buddhist arguments.
The main reason that Kagamishima considers Ishii's compromise position to be a reasonable one is that Ishii, somewhat like the Critical Buddhists, acknowledges a change during the last ³ve years of Dõgen's life, marking a new attitude toward the Eihei-ji environment and a period of spiritual growth. However, in sympathy with the traditionalist (a) position, Ishii tries not to exaggerate the role of the 12-fascicle text or downplay Dõgen's earlier and other later writings. Interpreting the multifaceted change in Dõgen's life requires an examination of all aspects of what Dõgen was saying and writing in this period-it is not enough to limit oneself to the 12-fascicle text, which in fact does not express a single, uniform, coherent view, but uses multiple voices to reµect different inµuences and convey diverse messages. Ishii emphasizes that an understanding of the post-Kamakura period depends on a point-by-point comparative analysis of Dõgen's thinking as expressed in both the 12-fascicle text and the other later works.
Ishii's approach to the Shõbõgenzõ issues centers on the interrelatedness of the 12-fascicle text and two other Dõgen texts from this period, showing the "intra-textuality" of the later Shõbõgenzõ writings, the Eihei kõroku collection of jõdõ or formal-style sermons (the majority of which were composed from 1247-1253), and the Hõkyõki µ‰z 18 collection of conversations Dõgen had in China with Ju-ching. He also shows the intertextuality involved in Dõgen's frequent references in his later works to the texts of Hung-chih, Ju-ching, and a variety of early Buddhist texts. The intra-and intertextual dimensions reveal changes in the style and substance of Dõgen's thought, but not necessarily in a way that supports Critical Buddhism. For example, the Eihei kõroku provides an example of how Dõgen shifted in his later period from the informal or jishu style of the 75-fascicle text to the more formal jõdõ style.
19 His citations and allusions to Hung-chih and Ju-ching in the Eihei kõroku also increase signi³cantly in the post-Kamakura period, and it is clear that the rewritten fascicles of the 12-fascicle text use many more citations from early Zen and Buddhist writings, including Zen goroku, Mah"y"na sðtras (especially the Lotus Sðtra), and j"taka tales.
20 However, these stylistic changes could indicate an emulation of the patterns of Sung Ch'an or the continuing inµuence of Japanese Tendai as much as a return to the fundamental doctrine of dependent origination. Examining changes in the substance of Dõgen's thought by comparing the 12-fascicle text with other texts on speci³c topics also gives a mixed message. There is some agreement in that the Eihei kõroku (no. 412), like "Shizen biku," criticizes sankyõ itchi, and that the Hõkyõki (no. 20), like "Sanjigo," records Ju-ching's refutation of Chang-sha's view of karma. However, Ishii believes that an examination of all of the later texts shows that the key to the spiritual change in the later period was a renewed emphasis on the priority of "purposeless zazen." The lack of attention to this issue in the 12-fascicle text is an incongruity that undermines the standpoint of Critical Buddhism and highlights the traditionalist (a) view of complementary, audience-speci³c texts.
The following chart sums up the major differences between Critical Buddhism and the two forms of traditional Buddhism on four interpretive issues: 1) Dõgen's intention in revising the Shõbõgenzõ; 2) the status of the rewritten fascicles; 3) the main emphasis of his later works; and 4) Dõgen's view of hongaku thought.
Critical Buddhism
Traditional ( 
Conclusions: Evaluation of the Contributions of Critical Buddhism
While Sõtõ scholars consider the Critical Buddhist movement overly sensational, other observers may view it as a "stirring of the waters" (or perhaps a "tempest in a teapot"). Those Buddhists and buddhologists who have been subjected to its often scathing criticisms may take offense, and some scholars and thinkers have responded that Critical Buddhism is actually a veiled form of fundamentalism (see FAURE, forthcoming) which deems itself alone worthy of determining authentic forms of religion based on a simple and perhaps arbitrary commitment to the doctrine of dependent origination and a sectarian preference for a particular set of Dõgen's writings. The accusation of funda-mentalism must seem both ironic and disturbing to the Critical Buddhists, who probably see themselves as quite unfundamentalist for several reasons: they appeal to the critical intellect rather than simplistic theological af³rmation and faith based on the inerrancy of scripture; they aim for progressive reform rather than the conservative or reactionary political agenda found in many Western fundamentalist movements; and they are not involved in elaborately organized evangelical or healing rituals. Some of the New Religions in Japan, such as Sõka Gakkai, appear to qualify much more readily as "fundamentalist," though such labels must be used with great caution. Hakamaya has already responded to some of his critics by stressing that Critical Buddhism, if it is to be genuine, must involve a continuing process of wholehearted self-criticism. In order to clarify the criticisms of the methodology thus far, as well as the contributions it has made, it is necessar y to evaluate the Critical Buddhist and traditionalist approaches to the Shõbõgenzõ in light of their broader impact on Buddhist studies and comparative religious thought as a whole. My suggestion is that it is more appropriate to view Critical Buddhism as an example of "foundationalism," that is, as a sector of the religion trying to reinterpret its medieval sources from a classical or foundational standpoint and in terms of distinctively modern social and philosophical concerns. In its analysis of the meaning and relevance of the Shõbõgenzõ texts, Critical Buddhism has, at the very least, contributed to a breaking down of some of the barriers between South and East Asian studies by commenting for the ³rst time on hongaku and Zen thought from the perspective of M"dhyamika dialectical negation. Although the traditional scholars dispute Critical Buddhism on textual and historical grounds, the new methodological movement has exposed levels of sedimentation surrounding interpretations of the intentionality and merit of Dõgen's philosophical and practical writings. The depth and detail of the discussions of texts and intertexts by the Critical and traditional Buddhists has contributed to a full-scale revision in our understanding of Dõgen that has helped revitalize the Sõtõ sect, currently facing an array of dif³cult and even bewildering social issues. This in turn has awakened Buddhism from its discriminatory slumber and prompted a self-reµection about what authentic Buddhism is, based on ideological continuity with the doctrine of causality. For many years, Buddhist thought, as opposed to Buddhist studies, was centered in Kyoto, and particularly in the Nishida-Tanabe-Nishitani Kyoto School. Now Critical Buddhism in Tokyo has stolen some of its thunder and criticized Nishida's philosophy of place (basho õ‹, based on the Greek topos) as a dh"tu-vada, topical philosophy linked to prewar nationalism.
The main aim of Critical Buddhism is to demonstrate that, amid an array of de³cient alternatives, the 12-fascicle Shõbõgenzõ text provides a legitimate historical precedent for modern reform, a role model that can be extracted from its original context and made relevant to the contemporary scene. Critical Buddhism is not the ³rst methodology that has attempted to lay a theoretical ground for social reform. There is, for example, the Rinzai priest/scholar AKIZUKI Ryõmin, who writes on numerous topics including Dõgen and whose calls for a "new Mah"y"na" issue from a postmodern viewpoint that has a "painful awareness of the demands facing Buddhism today, both from within and from without" (1990, p. 155) . The late Hisamatsu Shin'ichi created the reform F.A.S. society to promote world peace, and ICHI-KAWA Hakugen (1970) has called for Buddhist intellectuals to share responsibility for Japanese atrocities committed during the AsiaPaci³c War, as these were based on a false sense of harmony that led to compliance with the totalitarian regime (see IVES 1992) . But the Critical Buddhist project, with its sometimes excessive hyperbole, risks creating an inµated sense of the purity and authenticity of Dõgen's thought and simultaneously denigrating most of the Sõtõ sect's history after Dõgen. It also appears exclusivist, even combative, toward most of the already polarized and fragmented Chinese and Japanese Buddhist sects. Many feel that Critical Buddhism is simply trying to "save" Dõgen from a host of challenges (though Hakamaya claims a higher regard for Hõnen) and is all too ready to abandon Sõtõ and other syncretistic forms of East Asian Buddhism-as if any thinker, Š"kyamuni and Dõgen included, is immune from charges of syncretism. Although Critical Buddhism does not intend to foster exclusivism, it is perhaps inevitable that its tone of being engagé and even enragé creates such an impression.
There are two reasons for the misimpressions about Critical Buddhism, one based on shortcomings in what the Critical Buddhists have accomplished and the other based on complexities involved in determining and assessing its unique methodological orientation.
The ³rst involves a set of limitations inherent in the arguments of both Critical and traditional Buddhism, which remain bound by Dõgen apologetics and never move much beyond the arena of Dõgen studies. Because of this, the Critical Buddhists have left several problematic areas in Dõgen's writings outside the boundaries of their discourse. The most signi³cant area involves the role of magico-religious ritualism directly reµected in the 12-fascicle Shõbõgenzõ as well as other works of Dõgen's post-Kamakura period, including the Eihei kõroku and other records of his sermons. Some passages in the 12-fascicle text support the Critical Buddhist view of karmic determinism devoid of supernaturalism. Among the rewritten fascicles, for example, two of the earlier versions, "Hotsumujõshin" and "Daishugyõ," are primarily concerned with the ritual ef³cacy of building stupas and the burial of monks, respectively, while the new versions-"Hotsubodaishin" and "Jinshin inga"-focus exclusively on the issues of impermanence and causality. However, other passages in the 12-fascicle text tend to give an entirely different picture of Dõgen as a popularizer who uncritically af³rms all aspects of Buddhist religiosity. To illustrate the meaning of karma, for instance, Dõgen refers to miracles and magical deeds, such as a eunuch whose sexual status is reversed, a prostitute whose life dramatically changes because she brieµy wears a Buddhist robe, and the power of animal transformations involving a fox and deer. Most of these examples are drawn from j"taka tales, as noted by the traditionalist (b) scholars, or perhaps more directly from the Abhidharmamah"vibh"s" (T 27.592a-93b) .
One area the Critical Buddhists need to explore is how Dõgen's view of karma may have been inµuenced by related doctrines in other forms of Kamakura Buddhism, including the notions of mujõ [ø (impermanence), innen ƒâ (karmic fate), õjõ ð´(rebirth), and mappõ =À (age of the degenerate law). Dõgen may also have been affected by the increasingly popular setsuwa tales, such as the Konjaku monogatari, which were the primary textual vehicle for j"takas and which convey a literal view of karmic determinism in the past, present, and future lives. This latter aspect may well have developed subsequent to the original P"li sources (NAKAMURA 1973, pp. 29-34) . Furthermore, the Critical Buddhists need to address a number of historical, philological, and philosophical issues involved in interpreting Dõgen's literal view of karma. Aside from the larger question of whether dependent origination can be considered the single preeminent doctrine in early Buddhism (the Nik"yas, for example, contain several different versions of Š"kyamuni's realization), there is another question central to Shõbõgenzõ studies: What is the relation between the accumulation of karmic merit and the attainment of a transcendental awareness that remains bound by karma? (See KEOWN 1993, pp. 83-126; KALUPAHANA 1975, pp. 89-146; HIRAKAWA 1990, pp. 170-219 .) Does Dõgen's later standpoint recreate the problematic Abhidharma view of separating merit from transcendence, a view that M"dhyamika refutes? Is there not a need to critically evaluate the 12-fascicle text itself (MATSUMOTO 1991, p. 240)? In addition, Critical Buddhism should explain more fully other possible inµuences on Dõgen's later writings, such as that of repentance meditation in T'ien-t'ai/Tendai practice. Critical Buddhism also needs to connect its interpretation of Dõgen's thought to a whole series of subsequent developments in Sõtõ Zen and Japanese Buddhism leading up to the modern social crises. These include textual issues, such as the role of the early medieval Shõbõgenzõ commentaries by Senne and Kyõgõ, which set the stage for later interpretations of Dõgen especially with regard to hongaku thought. Also important are historical studies, such as the effect of the Tokugawa-era Buddhist parish (danka) system and the Meiji-era Shinto-Buddhist separation (shinbutsu bunri) on the role of Zen in contemporary society.
The second reason for misimpressions is that it is dif³cult to identify and categorize Critical Buddhist methodology in a modern context. Critical Buddhism is strictly neither historical scholarship nor speculative philosophy (although it tends to resemble both), and it may appear dogmatic and argumentative compared to the conventional standards of objectivity and rationality in these disciplines. As in modern studies of most religious traditions, there tends to be a methodological gap in Buddhist studies between, on the one hand, ³eldwork studies following a social-scienti³c model and focusing on ritual praxis and living encounters with symbols and, on the other hand, textual studies following philological or hermeneutic models and focusing on an analysis of scripture and various genres of scriptural commentary. However, within the domain of textual studies there is often another, more subtle, but perhaps even more signi³cant gap between the historical approach and the comparative philosophical approach. The historian asks when, where, and who wrote the text without succumbing to speculative inquiries, while the philosopher asks how and why the text was written and what its meaning is, without limiting the inquiry to a particular diachronic context. The textual historian may feel that the philosopher takes too much liberty with the source material, while the philosopher may feel con³ned by the seemingly arti³cial boundaries of discourse set up and enforced by the historian. Philosophers may see historians as overly skeptical about Buddhism's apparent contradictions and problematics, while historians may believe that philosophers present an idealized view of the tradition shorn of inconsistencies based on cultural conditioning.
However, Critical Buddhism as an example of "foundationalism" really does not try to duplicate the methods of either objective scholarship or rational philosophy in the contemporary sense. Instead, its main model is classical Buddhist scholasticism, which is deliberately evaluative rather than neutral or descriptive in its approach to interpreting various ideologies. Buddhist scholasticism, particularly the approach known as "hierarchical evaluation of the teachings" (kyõhan î|), seeks to provide an orthodox theological (rather than objective buddhological) ground for a particular form of orthopraxis by contrasting its own approach with alternatives that are judged to be partial, misleading, or de³cient. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the hermeneutics of scholastic hierarchical classi³cation, which is intended to be evaluative and polemical, and the hermeneutics of scholarship, which tries to maintain objectivity and neutrality. In this case, Critical Buddhist foundational scholasticism uses the 12-fascicle Shõbõgenzõ philosophy of karmic retribution to support a broad-based reform movement underway not only within the Sõtõ sect in Japan but throughout a number of other Buddhist movements, including "socially engaged Buddhism" in America. It transforms traditional concerns with monastic practice and discipline into contemporary concerns for social commitment and responsibility. Despite occasional rhetorical excess, it is a generally consistent and constructively critical method, though not without µaws and lacunae.
Therefore, Critical Buddhist foundationalism more closely resembles other recent forms of Western theology than it does either religious scholarship or fundamentalism. One example is deconstructive theology, often compared to M"dhyamika Buddhism, which highlights and deconstructs the substantive ideological presuppositions underlying conventional theology in its attempt to unravel and decenter all logocentric (dh"tu-v"da) standpoints (see TAYLOR 1984) . Deconstructionism exposes the sociopolitical context underlying theological rhetoric, though it usually does not endorse a social agenda.
Another comparison can be made to liberation theology, which advocates a rethinking of the foundational sources (i.e., the Gospels) as the basis for contemporary social reform and justice. Like Critical Buddhism, liberation theology has been criticized both for too liberally diverging from and too conservatively remaining within the framework of traditional Christianity (BENAVIDES 1989) . However, the comparison breaks down for two reasons. First, the Latin American sociopolitical situation interacts with one religion (Roman Catholicism), whereas Japanese Buddhism must operate in an increasingly secularized country with a long history of religious pluralism. Also, liberation theology is based on a distinction and conµict between oppressor and oppressed and is inµuenced by Marxism. Should Critical Buddhism wish to identify its methodology more fully with the cause of the oppressed, such as the minority groups serviced by Sõtõ temples for funeral ceremonies, it could probably ³nd a better basis than Dõgen's elitist monasticism. Among these might be medieval Sõtõ popularization or Pure Land millenial movements, which in different ways offered spiritual uplift and hope to the downtrodden and displaced.
The main contribution of Critical Buddhism to the debate between historical and philosophical textual studies lies in its effort to bridge the methodological gap by reexamining and reevaluating areas of shift, transition, and syncretism from the standpoint of philosophical consistency and continuity with the foundational doctrines of Buddhist thought. According to this movement, Buddhism can and must change, and the model for this must come from within the tradition. However, for Critical Buddhism to make the 12-fascicle text the basis for reform and have a concrete impact on contemporary society, the methodology must deal with one overriding issue: How exactly does Dõgen's view of karma, or the Critical Buddhist view of Dõgen's view, promote social change? Can, in other words, Dõgen's understanding of karmic causality in a medieval monastic context be translated into an agenda for the modern social reform of institutional Buddhism?
